


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The Caribbean: Sources of Illegal Migration

Air Intelligence Assessment

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May 1978

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The Caribbean: Sources of Illegal Migration

Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center

May 1978

Key Judgments

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Roughly 100,000 Caribbean nationals enter this country illegally each year. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The English-speaking Caribbean countries as a whole supply 60 percent of all illegals from the region. About one-half of this share—some 29,000 people—comes from Jamaica. The other major English-speaking countries in order of importance as source areas are Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados. The Dominican Republic is the largest single source of illegal migrants, supplying about one-third of the total. Creole-speaking Haiti is in fourth place. The French islands and the Dutch-speaking nations of the region are unimportant as sources of illegal migration to the United States.

Migration has long been a way of life in the densely populated islands of the English-speaking Caribbean, and, unlike the Mexican migrant, nationals from the area show little attachment to their homeland. Such migration is necessary to keep the islands from being hopelessly overcrowded and is tacitly supported by most of the governments. Traditionally, most migration outside the region has been to the United Kingdom; however, in the mid-1960s after the British Government changed its immigration laws to keep out most Commonwealth nationals, the flow was diverted to the United States and Canada. Although much of this migration was legal, it was at this time that large-scale illegal migration from the English-speaking Caribbean began.

The Dominican illegal presents a sharp contrast to the migrant from the English-speaking Caribbean. Illegals from the Dominican Republic tend to be less educated and poorer than those from any other major source area within or outside the Caribbean, and almost half are from rural areas.

The Haitian illegal is a third type. Despite Haiti's extreme poverty, the Haitian migrant is often more prosperous than either his Dominican or British West Indian counterpart. Indeed, only the relatively affluent Haitian can afford the costs of obtaining exit papers and transportation. The typical Haitian illegal is a relatively well-educated urbanite who claims a political motivation for leaving his country.

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Most Caribbean illegals enter this country with documentation; for obvious reasons there is very little surreptitious border crossing of the Mexican type. Most frequently, the Caribbean migrant obtains a legal nonresident visa, which he subsequently abuses. In other cases, he uses forged papers or papers obtained under false pretenses. Some English-speaking illegals use the US Virgin Islands as a way station to the continental United States. Many Dominicans go first to Puerto Rico, where they have little difficulty passing for natives and obtaining work. Some, after several months or years in Puerto Rico, feel financially secure enough to make the jump to New York. Many illegals, of course, remain permanently in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

We believe that the flow of Caribbean illegals to the United States will increase over the next decade. Many in the under-20 age bulge that emerged in the 1970s are now entering the migration-prone age group between 20 and 30. Based on demographic and economic trends, we expect that the Dominican Republic, Jamaica,

and Haiti will become more important as source countries and that the flow from Guyana will remain at its current high level. Only in Barbados and, to a much lesser extent, in Trinidad and Tobago are there any prospects for a decline in the illegal outflow.

Paradoxically, an acceleration in economic development—and this is unlikely during the next decade—would only encourage illegal migration by increasing the number of people with the financial wherewithal to leave; the same may be said of political liberalization. Repressive past dictatorships in Haiti and the Dominican Republic were able to retain many dissatisfied nationals by making any attempt to leave extremely dangerous; relaxation was followed by a wave of migration. Although Manley's Jamaica is not to be compared to Trujillo's Dominican Republic or Papa Doc Duvalier's Haiti, political and economic regulations now in force are undoubtedly working to limit migration at the same time they increase the desire to migrate.

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The Caribbean: Sources of Illegal Migration

Introduction

The perennially depressed Caribbean region,¹ the second-largest source of illegal migrants to the United States, is steadily growing in importance. Although in an average year the area supplies only about one-sixth as many illegals as does Mexico, the Caribbean illegal is much more likely to remain permanently in the United States. He is also more likely to eventually bring in other family members. Given the age structure in the Caribbean islands, the economic and political insecurity that plagues many of the nations, and the large growing gap between US and Caribbean wage rates, the problem can only get worse.

We estimate that nearly 100,000 illegal migrants from the Caribbean have entered the United States annually in recent years. An additional 5,000 to 10,000 illegals probably enter Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands annually. Although most illegals in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands remain there, an increasingly large minority are using these US territories as a way station to the continental United States. At any one time, nearly 20 percent of the 3 million to 5 million illegal migrants of all nationalities residing in the United States are of Caribbean origin.²

The Dynamics of the Caribbean Migration

Large-scale Caribbean migration to the United States—legal or illegal—is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until the early 1960s, colo-

¹ Includes the Caribbean Islands (except Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands), Belize, and Guyana.

nial relationships and cultural ties directed migration from most islands to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France. Except for a relatively few political refugees and seasonal farm workers, emigration was minimal from Haiti and the Dominican Republic, both economically backward and repressive dictatorships. There is, nevertheless, a longstanding tradition of internal migration within and among the islands. Such migration accelerated after World War II.

Internal Migration

During most of the postwar period the largest single migration pattern was from rural to urban areas. The chief attraction was the economic opportunity in the rapidly expanding tourism, oil, and light manufacturing sectors, where average wages exceeded rural pay by 200 percent or more. The percentage of the Caribbean population living in urban areas has almost doubled in the past 25 years to at least 30 percent, reaching an estimated 4.9 million people by 1978. Even this figure seriously understates the number of Caribbean residents who have acquired an urban life-style, since the suburbs of many cities and resort areas in the smaller islands are not considered urban areas in official statistics.


In addition to these internal movements, substantial migration among the various islands has always existed. Besides the traditional seasonal migration of agricultural workers—particularly from Haiti to the Dominican Republic—the flow of urban workers from the poorer to the richer islands within the English-speaking Caribbean area increased sharply during the 1960s. Urban areas in the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago received most of this flow, while the major sending states were Guyana, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Altogether, interisland movements have involved the shift of about 500,000 persons over the past 15 years.

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Caribbean : Main Sources of Illegal Migration to the United States



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External Migration

In the past, the legal flow from the English-speaking Caribbean to the United Kingdom was the most important pattern of external migration. At its peak in the early 1960s, this movement involved 50,000 to 70,000 persons annually—equal to about 3 to 4 percent of the total labor force of the English-speaking Caribbean. The legal flow to the United States—only about 4,000 persons annually in the 1950s—began to pick up in the early 1960s and averaged 13,000 persons annually during 1960-65. Most of the immigrants to the United States were Dominican, Haitian, and Jamaican political dissidents or jobseekers; only a few migrants came from other parts of the Caribbean. Smaller numbers migrated permanently to Canada, France, and the Netherlands—about 8,000 persons annually during this period. In contrast to the internal pattern, the lion's share of those leaving the region were artisans, shopkeepers, professionals, and others not directly engaged in agriculture.


Beginning in the mid-1960s, changes in immigration laws shifted the pattern of legal migration away from the United Kingdom toward the United States and Canada (see figure 1). While tighter British controls have cut the flow to the United Kingdom to less than 5,000 persons annually since 1970, this decline has been offset by the annual movement of about 65,000 legal migrants to the United States and Canada. Altogether legal out-migration has averaged 75,000 persons annually in recent years, roughly the same level as in the early 1960s.

The Illegal Migrant

Illegal migration from the Caribbean to the United States, now at about 100,000 persons a year, substantially exceeds legal migration and, together with legal migration, offsets as much as one-half of the yearly growth in the region's labor force. The increase in illegal migration to the United States in the 1960s reflected the limits imposed on legal outlets as well as changes in the political situation in the Dominican Republic that made migration easier. By 1970, however, the increase in legal migration to the United States

had offset much of the decrease in the legal movement to the United Kingdom. Thus, the illegal flow is in addition to—rather than replacing—the legal flow.

Illegal migration to the United States is facilitated by several factors. In particular, Caribbean nationals have relatively easy access to Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, which frequently serve as way stations for the illegal migrant going to the continental United States. Moreover, the illegal migrant finds material and psychological support among legal and illegal residents from his own country in the United States.




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Figure 1

Caribbean: Direction of Legal Migration



1 Almost exclusively to France and the Netherlands.
2 Estimated.

Economics of Migration

Although many illegals from Haiti and parts of the English-speaking Caribbean claim political motivation, the principal reason for migration is

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Table 1
US and Caribbean Wages

	Index: US Craftsmen Wages = 100		
	1960	1970	1975
Average US daily earnings			
Craftsmen	100	100	100
Manufacturing workers	100	85	85
Clerical workers	93	69	67
Private household workers	24	24	24
Urban daily minimum wages			
Dominican Republic	7	9	9
Haiti	3	3	3
Jamaica	NA	9	9
Trinidad and Tobago	10	11	12
Other Caribbean countries	NA	6	6
Rural daily minimum wages			
Dominican Republic	4	6	6
Haiti	1	1	1
Jamaica	NA	6	6
Trinidad and Tobago	4	6	6
Other Caribbean countries	NA	5	5

economic. As shown in table 1, wage differentials between the United States and the Caribbean are huge. Even in high-wage Caribbean countries like Jamaica, the average urban minimum wage is only 40 percent of the US average wage for private household workers, 15 percent of that for clerical workers, and roughly 10 percent of that for manufacturing workers and craftsmen. While the wage gap provides a strong attraction, another factor is the limited opportunity for upward economic mobility at home. Even university-educated professionals on the most prosperous Caribbean islands find their economic horizons severely circumscribed.

In these circumstances, it is surprising that even more Caribbean nationals are not migrating. Several factors militate against this, however. The psychological costs of pulling up roots and changing culture and language are important, especially for rural Haitians. These costs are not as high for Dominicans, who generally migrate via culturally similar Puerto Rico, or for most other Caribbean migrants, who speak English and have a long tradition of external migration.

Of even greater importance is the financial cost of migration. In contrast to the illegal from central Mexico, who pays \$200 to \$300 for trans-

portation and smuggling fees, the Haitian pays at least \$450, including official documents and air fare. Moreover, bribes to circumvent long processing delays can add considerably to these costs. US rules add to the cost of obtaining nonresident visas. The migrant, for example, must purchase a round-trip ticket, which costs more than \$250 between most islands and the US mainland. He must also prove self-sufficiency, evidenced by funds in the bank and/or the ownership of property. These financial costs effectively limit migration—legal or illegal—to the relatively affluent Caribbean national.

Sources of Illegal Migration

it appears that the Dominican Republic is the origin of about one-third of the illegal migrants from the Caribbean area. Jamaica is in second place with about 30 percent, followed by Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Guyana, and Barbados (see figure 2). The smaller British islands are believed to contribute illegal migrants in rough proportion to their population. The English-speaking Caribbean as a whole supplies 60 percent of all Caribbean illegals, or about 60,000 persons annually.

Evidence indicates that Belize, the Cayman Islands, and the Dutch and French islands of the West Indies supply relatively few illegals to the United States. There appears to be some illegal movement from the Dutch islands of Curacao and Aruba to Venezuela and from Belize to Mexico. The few illegals in the United States from the Dutch and French islands as well as from the Cayman Islands are believed to be seamen who jump ship in US ports.


Economic Characteristics

The major sending countries—the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti—make up 82 percent of the total Caribbean population (see table 2). They differ considerably in terms of economic and social development, with Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica the most advanced and Haiti the least. Annual per capita income in Trinidad and Tobago, for example, is almost \$2,400, reflecting the influence of the oil industry (see table 3). Similarly, bauxite

Figure 2

Caribbean: Estimated Illegal Migration to the United States,¹ 1977

Thousand Persons



¹ Includes illegal migration to Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

and manufacturing have helped boost per capita income in Jamaica to more than \$1,400. In contrast, per capita income is only \$800 in the Dominican Republic and \$200 in Haiti. This, in part, reflects the fact that these two economies are based on agriculture.

Despite large-scale emigration, the major economies have been unable to absorb labor supply growth (see figure 3). This is particularly true of the rural sector, even though in most countries agriculture remains heavily labor intensive. In Guyana and the Dominican Republic, where commercial agricultural growth has been the highest, output gains have been associated more with increased productivity than increased

employment. Haiti, on the other hand, lags well behind other source countries in developing commercial farming; the growth of its rural population substantially outpaces the creation of new jobs. As a result, output per agricultural worker is far below the Caribbean average, and improvements are slow in coming.

Growth outside the farm sector has generated some new jobs, but not many. In Jamaica, only about 58,000 new jobs were created outside the agricultural sector between 1960 and 1975—a gain of 18 percent—compared with a 30-percent increase in the nonagricultural labor force. As a result, urban unemployment surged well above 20 percent of the urban labor force, approaching

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Table 2
Caribbean: Population ¹

	1950	1960	1970	January 1978	Average Annual Growth Rate 1961-70	Average Annual Growth Rate 1971-77 ²
	Thousand Persons				Percent	
Total	9,187	11,257	13,594	16,427	1.9	1.8
Haiti	3,100	3,500	4,235	5,300	1.9	2.0
Dominican Republic	2,136	3,047	4,006	5,051	2.8	2.4
Jamaica	1,420	1,610	1,814	2,130	1.2	1.6
Trinidad and Tobago	580	828	938	1,038	1.3	1.2
Guyana	445	546	699	804	2.5	1.6
French West Indies ³	590	620	650	657	0.5	Neg ¹
British Associated States ⁴	275	337	367	425	0.9	1.1
Netherlands Antilles	162	192	224	246	1.6	1.1
Barbados	200	232	237	240	0.2	0.3
Bahamas	84	125	169	221	3.1	3.1
Belize	75	90	120	149	2.9	2.5
Other	120	130	135	166	0.4	1.5

¹ Population data for 1950-70 are from Caribbean censuses. The 1978 estimate is from the US Bureau of the Census.

² Based on US Bureau of the Census estimates.

³ Guadeloupe and Martinique.

⁴ Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent.

Table 3
Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Indicators

	Barbados	Dominican Republic	Guyana	Haiti Persons	Jamaica	Trinidad and Tobago	Other Caribbean Countries
Population per square kilometer, mid-1977	578	102	4	171	185	202	271 ¹
				US\$			
Per capita income, 1976	1,370	785	525	195	1,440	2,360	350 to 6,000
Value added per agricultural worker, 1975	2,706	1,130	2,086	220	1,051	2,019	1,300
Industrial wages, 1975 ²	39	40	20	9	42	73	20
				Percent			
Industrial employment, 1975 ³	16	12	31	7	12	19	14
Urbanization, 1970	4 ⁴	40	32	21	41	12 ⁵	18
Literacy	97	68	85	11	40 to 82	94	80

¹ Caribbean islands only.

² Average weekly remuneration in manufacturing and mining, including wages and fringe benefits.

³ Employment in manufacturing and mining as a share of total employment.

⁴ Bridgetown only. Suburbs and other towns make actual urbanization higher.


⁵ Three largest cities only. Suburbs and other towns make actual urbanization higher.

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Figure 3

Caribbean Major Source Countries:
Population, Labor Force, and Employment



40 percent among Jamaican youth; overall under-employment probably reached 40 percent. Trinidad and Tobago did not do much better because of the capital-intensive nature of its oil sector.

The manufacturing sectors of all the Caribbean nations are so small that even rapid growth

creates relatively few employment opportunities. In the Dominican Republic—the most successful country in this respect—about 5,000 new jobs have been generated annually in the manufacturing sector since 1960. This is sufficient to absorb less than one-fourth of the growth in the urban work force, and about 20 percent of the urban

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Table 4

Caribbean: Age Distribution, 1970

	Percent						
	Total Caribbean	Barbados	Dominican Republic	Guyana	Haiti	Jamaica	Trinidad and Tobago
Total population	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
4 and younger	17	13	18	17	15	17	15
5-9	15	12	17	16	14	17	15
10-14	13	13	13	14	13	13	13
15-19	10	11	11	11	11	9	11
20-24	8	8	8	8	8	7	9
25-29	7	6	7	7	7	6	7
30 and older	30	37	26	27	32	31	30

labor force is unemployed. Throughout the Caribbean, growth of employment in the important service sector has stagnated since 1974, largely because of the failure of tourism and related construction to rebound fully from the US recession.

High rates of female participation in the labor force have aggravated employment problems in the major source countries. In Jamaica, women now hold almost one-half of the jobs outside agriculture, including about 30 percent of the jobs in industry. This pattern is fairly typical throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, where easy access to academic training encourages female participation. The combination of work and school experience helps explain the relatively high proportion of female illegal migrants from Jamaica and other English-speaking countries. Last year, women made up perhaps 30 percent of all illegal migrants coming from the Caribbean.

Demographic Characteristics

Caribbean areas that generate the majority of illegal aliens have a number of demographic characteristics in common. In particular, urban population growth since 1960 has been exceptionally rapid, averaging more than 5 percent annually. In addition, the age distribution of their populations (including the urban male population—that is, those most likely to emigrate to the United States) is heavily concentrated in the younger ages. As may be seen in table 4, 45

percent of the region's population in 1970 was below the age of 15—about the same as in Mexico. The population was somewhat younger than the norm in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Guyana. By contrast, only 38 percent of Barbados' population was below the age of 15, the result of the island's long history of family planning and especially heavy emigration of women of childbearing age.


Because of heavy emigration, the population of the Caribbean region is growing considerably less rapidly than that of Latin America as a whole. Population growth in the Caribbean averaged 1.9 percent annually between 1960 and 1970, compared with 2.8 percent for Latin America as a whole. During this period the outflow of legal and illegal migrants offset about 30 percent of the natural increase in the region's total population (see figure 4). In other words, without migration the population growth rate of the Caribbean region would have been about 2.6 percent. Emigration actually halved the natural increase in the English-speaking countries and exceeded or matched the natural increases on Barbados and a few smaller islands.

Population growth for the Dominican Republic is near the top of the Caribbean range—2.8 percent annually during the 1960s. Basically, this reflects exceptionally high Dominican birth rates and the relatively limited scope of legal migration. In Haiti, high mortality and some migration to nearby countries held population growth to 1.9

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Figure 4

Caribbean Natural Population Increase¹ and Net Emigration, 1961-70



percent annually during this period. In contrast to most other Caribbean countries, where the absolute number of rural residents has fallen since the early 1960s, the rural population of the Dominican Republic and Haiti has continued to grow despite the exodus to urban areas.

Government Policies

Caribbean governments have generally ignored the issue of illegal migration. Even in those cases where officials have voiced concern over the departure of professional and other skilled workers, little has been done to curb their leaving. Although most countries have some family planning, these efforts are fairly recent and too

small to have much effect on urban population growth for some time. As for economic development policies, spending programs generally aim at helping those with the least skills—who are also the least likely to migrate. This approach stems from both humanitarian considerations and from the desire to maintain political stability in the English-speaking Caribbean in the face of mounting violence.

Development Policies

Government development policies, to the extent that they have been effective, may have worsened the migration problem. Migrants tend to be relatively well-educated, skilled workers

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with enough savings or credit to meet the substantial costs of migration. Successful development increases the size of the group with these characteristics.

Most of the region's development plans are misnamed, however, in that they are designed to absorb unskilled labor for political reasons rather than to spur economic development. By and large, rural-to-urban migration is accepted as inevitable, and government programs are aimed at providing low-level jobs in urban areas. Only Guyana and the Dominican Republic have provided the funds needed to spur agricultural development; the resulting increase in productivity was accompanied by an exodus of rural workers to the cities. The urban-centered programs have generally failed to provide more than short-term employment, usually in construction.

Faced with serious budget constraints, even such advanced countries as Trinidad and Tobago emphasize short-term employment. Development spending focuses on public works projects designed to absorb the growing number of unskilled entrants to the labor force. The problem of fostering adequate permanent employment to retain skilled workers is compounded to some extent by industrial incentive schemes that place high priority on capital-intensive production. In general, the number of workers in manufacturing has increased much more slowly than manufacturing output.

Economic development programs have been even less successful in the smaller countries. Hampered by small markets, local production cannot match the economies of scale of the larger Caribbean islands and is thus costlier. Militant unions in Barbados, Guyana, and other English-speaking countries have compounded these problems by boosting wages sharply—although not sharply enough to lessen the incentive for migration. Moreover, many of these countries have failed to adjust their currencies to compete effectively in the world markets and have established nationalistic policies that discourage foreign investment. As a result, employment in the industrial sectors of these nations has shown little or no growth in the past 10 years. Nascent regional

efforts to overcome these obstacles remain hamstrung by political rivalries.

Family Planning

Only Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are actively supporting large birth control programs, although the Dominican Republic and Haiti, under pressure from aid donors, have recently initiated modest programs. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, government responses range from grudgingly allowing the operation of private programs to complete disapproval in Guyana and Belize, the only countries with low population densities.

Despite increasing focus on the problem, family planning programs are unlikely to affect the outflow of migrants for many years. Much of the impact of past programs has been in rural areas of the English-speaking Caribbean—not major sources of illegal migrants. Although birth rates have steadily declined in most of these countries over the past decade, highly successful government efforts to reduce infant mortality have kept population growth rates from declining proportionately. The recent, modestly funded population control efforts in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, although concentrated in urban areas, are expected to have little immediate impact on urban population expansion.

Migration Policies

Tacit support of the traditional urge to emigrate has generally been the governments' main response to the problem of population growth. This approach has its drawbacks, however, since mostly skilled workers take advantage of liberal Caribbean emigration policies. Only Haiti has tried to deal directly with this problem by banning emigration of professional and other skilled workers during the 1960s; the effort was at least partially circumvented through influence and bribery. In response to lower immigration ceilings in the United Kingdom and a slowdown of economic activity at home, a number of Caribbean countries—including the Bahamas, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic—have set up legal barriers to immigration within the region during the last 10 years.

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Development Potential

All of the Caribbean economies—except possibly that of Trinidad and Tobago—face serious constraints on economic development in the foreseeable future. Although the region's population equals that of Peru, the fifth most populated country in Latin America, fragmented local markets and high transport costs make Caribbean economic development uniquely dependent on regional cooperation. The outlook for meaningful cooperation even among the English-speaking islands is dim, however.

Dominican Republic and Haiti

Although for the past decade the industrial sector has been the engine of growth in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, it remains too small to absorb much of the surplus of urban labor. Industrial employment engages only 12 percent of the Dominican labor force and 7 percent of the Haitian labor force. Moreover, a shortage of reliable energy sources, continuing import restrictions, and more restrictive investment policies are hampering industrial expansion in the Dominican Republic. The future of Haiti's fledgling labor-intensive manufacturing sector will depend on the country's ability to hold down wages, although a wider wage gap between Haiti and the United States will increase the motivation for migration.

Development of the agricultural sector—a necessity for feeding the growing population—is limited by a shortage of managerial and technical expertise and cultivable land. Nevertheless, some gains in the Dominican commercial farming sector have been achieved. Haiti, with the highest population density on cultivated land in Latin America, faces much more difficult development problems.

Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

Public spending by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in nonagricultural sectors has led to fairly diversified economies. Even so, their development potential is very different. Having experienced the sharpest consecutive declines in economic output of any less developed country

since 1973, Jamaica will be lucky to make up lost ground, let alone achieve additional growth in the near future. Although the need to restore economic balance has stemmed the government's leftward drift, foreign investors remain cautious. In contrast, Trinidad and Tobago—with the region's only known oil and gas reserves—is experiencing an oil-based economic boom that is spreading to other sectors.

Since capital-intensive industries will supply most of the growth in both economies, new jobs almost certainly will lag behind increases in the labor force. Continued depression in the agricultural sector, especially in Jamaica, will only add to the strain on urban absorptive capacity. New industries hold much more promise of containing high unemployment in Trinidad and Tobago than in Jamaica. Unlike those in Jamaica, skilled workers in Trinidad and Tobago should have little difficulty finding high-paying jobs.

Other Caribbean Countries

Development prospects elsewhere in the Caribbean are generally bleak. Overvalued currencies, lack of infrastructure, and small internal markets will continue to prevent the creation of many new jobs over the next 10 years. Already suffering from top-heavy bureaucracies, governments will be unable to add many public service jobs to counter stagnation in the private sector. Moreover, the prospect of gradual British withdrawal from the region may well result not only in reduced budget assistance but also in increased political instability.

Danger Points


We expect that the flow of Caribbean illegals to the United States will increase over the next decade. The character of this migration will remain basically unchanged as the Caribbean area becomes more urbanized and continuing sluggish economic performance limits employment opportunities. Even the relatively well educated will have difficulty finding high-paying jobs to match their skills despite the heavy exodus of workers in this group. Although rural underemployment is likely to increase over the next

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decade, few agricultural workers will have the necessary funds to move to the United States. Since Canada and the United Kingdom will probably maintain their immigration controls, only the most skilled workers will gain entry to these countries.


Many in the under-20 age bulge that emerged in the 1970s are now entering the large, migration-prone 20 to 30 age group. Their numbers alone will almost certainly result in increased illegal migration to the United States over the next 10 years. Even if family planning programs reduce fertility rates as expected, the large numbers of those already born will sustain migration.



Based on demographic characteristics and economic potential, we expect that the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Haiti will become more important as source countries and that the flow from Guyana will remain at the current high

level. Only Barbados and, to a much lesser extent, Trinidad and Tobago show any prospects for a decline in the illegal outflow. Demographic characteristics also indicate that the Bahamas will become a larger source of Caribbean illegals than in the past; because of the Bahamas' small population, however, the absolute increase in Bahamian illegals will be modest.

Dim prospects for accelerated economic development in the major source countries militate against any substantial change in the migration pattern. Ironically some economic improvement may well encourage illegal migration. Haiti is a case in point; increasing aid should cause a modest rise in real urban incomes that will increase the number of those with the financial wherewithal to leave. Only Trinidad and Tobago is likely to provide enough new jobs to greatly reduce the migration rate of its skilled workers. Much of the gain, however, would be offset by increased departures of relatively affluent workers with fewer skills.



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APPENDIX A

Dominican Republic

Sharply reduced economic growth since the mid-1970s and a migration pattern that has long focused on the United States and Puerto Rico make the Dominican Republic the region's largest source of illegal migration to the United States; about one-third of all Caribbean illegals are Dominicans. Roughly 70 percent of the 50,000 Dominicans who annually emigrate to the United States do so illegally. Most are ambitious urbanites escaping depressed wages. The sheer size of the agricultural work force, however, helps make the country the only sizable source of Caribbean illegals from rural areas. After a period of rapid economic progress in the early 1970s, the Dominican Republic's economic outlook has dimmed in recent years. Higher oil import costs, prolonged drought, and a sharp drop in sugar prices have led to a slowdown in job creation and a surge in illegal migration. The flow should continue to increase over the next decade because of the rapid growth in the pool of working-age people.

The Economy at a Glance

Sugar and other agricultural products are the mainstays of the Dominican economy, with the farm sector employing more than one-half of the labor force and accounting for one-fourth of gross domestic product (GDP). Agricultural processing dominates the manufacturing sector, which contributes another 20 percent to national output. The manufacturing sector—the largest in the Caribbean—expanded rapidly between 1969 and 1973 because of government incentives, such as reduced duties on imported capital and increased public outlays for basic infrastructure. The resulting shift to capital-intensive output has pushed worker productivity in manufacturing and mining to five times the level in agriculture. The country also made rapid strides in developing its varied mineral resources during the early 1970s.

Good agricultural performance initially cushioned much of the impact of the 1973-74 OPEC oil price hikes. Later the rising cost of imported oil, intermittent power blackouts, cuts in public spending brought on by declining revenues, and agricultural setbacks slowed industrial activity. Rather than opt for heavy foreign borrowing to spur economic growth, the Dominican Government chose to cut imports. As a result, economic growth has more than halved to 4.5 percent annually since 1974, compared with a yearly average of 10.6 percent during 1969-74.

Population Patterns

Stepped-up emigration cut population growth from 3.6 percent annually during the 1950s to 2.8 percent between 1960 and 1970. Even this reduced

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Dominican Republic

	1950	1960	1970
Population (thousand persons)	2,136 (100%)	3,047 (100%)	4,006 (100%)
Rural	1,628 (76%)	2,125 (70%)	2,411 (60%)
Urban	508 (24%)	922 (30%)	1,595 (40%)
	1951-60		1961-70
Average annual population growth (percent)	3.6		2.8
Rural	2.7		1.3
Urban	6.1		5.6
	1960		1975
Labor force (thousand persons)	903 (100%)		1,353 (100%)
Agriculture	600 (66%)		732 (54%)
Manufacturing and mining	74 (8%)		165 (12%)
Services	229 (26%)		458 (34%)
Daily wages (US \$)	1975		
Urban minimum	4.00		
Rural average	2.50		
	1976		
Annual per capita income (US \$)	785		
Gini coefficient *	0.61		
	1973-77		
Average annual real GDP growth (percent)	6.5		
	1960		1975
Gross domestic product (million US \$)	724 (100%)		3,596 (100%)
Agriculture	193 (27%)		827 (23%)
Manufacturing and mining	138 (19%)		935 (26%)
Services	393 (54%)		1,834 (51%)
	1960		1975
Value added per worker	802		2,654
Agriculture	322		1,130
Manufacturing and mining	1,865		5,667
Services	1,715		4,004
	1975		
Real GDP (Index: 1960 = 100)	259		
Agriculture	141		
Manufacturing and mining	370		
Services	299		
Labor productivity (Index: 1960 = 100)	172		
Agriculture	115		
Manufacturing and mining	166		
Services	150		
Major products			
Crops: sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, rice, corn			
Manufacturing: foodstuffs, textiles, cement, beverages,			
tobacco, furniture			
Mining: bauxite, gold, nickel			
	1960		1970
Cultivated land (thousand hectares)	1,319		1,450
Cultivated hectares per agricultural worker	2.2		2.0

* The Gini coefficient is an indicator of income distribution. Its value fluctuates between one and zero: as the income distribution becomes more nearly equal, the value approaches zero.

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rate of growth was among the highest in the Caribbean. Much higher urban wages attracted a large flow of rural workers to Santo Domingo and other urban areas; per capita urban incomes average about four times the rural level. The resulting 5.6-percent annual growth in urban population pushed the level of urbanization to 40 percent—second only to Jamaica in the region. With 48 percent of the population under 15 years of age in 1970, the number of Dominicans entering the migration-prone years will continue to rise at least through 1985.

The decline in population growth was reversed in the early 1970s, rising to 3 percent yearly, because rapid economic gains discouraged migration and encouraged procreation. Since 1975, however, massive emigration has reduced population growth to 1 percent. This drop stems from the worsened economic situation and increased emigration of women of childbearing age. Government family planning efforts initiated in the early 1970s have yet to have much impact.

Employment and Labor Force

Rapid growth in the labor force swamped expanding employment opportunities between 1960 and 1975. Despite modest gains in commercial agriculture, few new jobs were created because of the extremely large stock of underemployed workers. A large inflow of surplus agricultural workers pushed average annual growth of the nonagricultural labor force to 4.9 percent during the period. Despite rapid industrial growth, the capital-intensive nature of most new production facilities kept the expansion of nonagricultural jobs to 4 percent annually. As a result, urban unemployment doubled to about 20 percent. The situation would be much worse except that traditional biases against female employment have kept female participation in the labor force the lowest in Latin America.

Outlook

Illegal migration from the Dominican Republic will increase over the next decade. Slow growth in world sugar demand and increasing supplies of sugar substitutes will limit agricultural performance. Efforts to diversify agriculture are hampered by Santo Domingo's inexperience in marketing other crops. Industrial expansion is expected to remain well below former peak levels because the government is reluctant to borrow heavily on world capital markets to increase spending and boost consumer demand. Given the bleak employment prospects, the Dominican Government will resist taking strong measures to deter illegal migration.

APPENDIX B

Jamaica

Jamaica ranks as the region's largest source of illegal migrants to the United States after the Dominican Republic. Large disparities between rural and urban incomes have generated a massive rural exodus and aggravated severe urban labor surpluses. Prior to independence in 1962, more ambitious urbanites took advantage of Jamaica's colonial status to emigrate legally to the United Kingdom. Tight British controls since independence and recent domestic economic problems have encouraged a growing flow of urban workers to the United States and Canada. Roughly 70 percent of those Jamaicans who now migrate to the United States do so illegally. A surge of entrants to Jamaica's crowded urban labor market should maintain the heavy flow of illegals over the next decade.

The Economy at a Glance

During the 1960s, foreign investment spurred development of Jamaica's two most dynamic economic sectors, mining and tourism. The island is the world's third-largest bauxite producer, and mining and processing the ore generate 10 percent of total GDP with only 1 percent of the labor force. Because of the heavy use of machinery, worker productivity is eight times higher than the national average. Tourism provides 11,000 jobs and contributes 5 percent of GDP. Rapid growth of tourism and mining as well as protective trade policies facilitated expansion of a relatively broadly based manufacturing sector, now contributing more than 15 percent of GDP. By contrast, the island's decaying agricultural sector produces less than 10 percent of GDP while employing 29 percent of the labor force.

Erosion of investor confidence induced by Jamaica's leftward drift and a rise in violent crime have caused real output to decline to 86 percent of the 1973 level. Since 1973, Prime Minister Manley has sharply boosted bauxite taxes, nationalized much of the local bauxite mining operations, and completed takeovers of a few key private firms. As a result US aluminum producers have shifted to other bauxite suppliers, and domestic and foreign private capital is flowing out of the country. Moreover, tourism—initially hurt by the US recession of 1974 and 1975—continues to lag because of a highly publicized increase in violence directed at foreigners as well as stiffer competition from Western Europe.

Population Patterns

Heavy emigration shaved overall population growth to 1.2 percent annually between 1960 and 1970. Low per capita income in rural areas and a growing distaste for agricultural work precipitated a dramatic 1.5-percent

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Jamaica

	1950	1960	1970
Population (thousand persons)	1,420	1,610 (100%)	1,814 (100%)
Rural	NA	1,240 (77%)	1,063 (59%)
Urban	NA	370 (23%)	751 (41%)
	1951-60		1961-70
Average annual population growth (percent)	1.3		1.2
Rural	NA		-1.5
Urban	NA		7.3
	1960		1975
Labor force (thousand persons)	608 (100%)		672 (100%)
Agriculture	237 (39%)		195 (29%)
Manufacturing	91 (15%)		74 (11%)
Mining	8 (1%)		8 (1%)
Services	272 (45%)		395 (59%)
Daily wages (US \$)	1978		
Urban minimum	4.56		
Rural average	2.50		
	1976		
Annual per capita income (US \$)	1,440		
Gini coefficient*	0.67		
	1973-77		
Average annual real GDP growth (percent)	-3.8		
	1960		1975
Gross domestic product (million US \$)	518 (100%)		2,925 (100%)
Agriculture	57 (11%)		205 (7%)
Manufacturing	65 (12%)		497 (17%)
Mining	46 (9%)		292 (10%)
Services	350 (68%)		1,931 (66%)
	1960		1975
Value added per worker (US \$)	852		4,353
Agriculture	241		1,051
Manufacturing	714		6,716
Mining	5,720		36,500
Services	1,287		4,889
	1975		
Real GDP (Index: 1960 = 100)	194		
Agriculture	119		
Manufacturing	258		
Mining	200		
Services	194		
Labor productivity (Index: 1960 = 100)	176		
Agriculture	145		
Manufacturing	318		
Mining	200		
Services	133		
Major products			
Crops: sugarcane, bananas, coffee, pimento			
Manufacturing: foodstuffs, rum, light manufactures			
Mining: bauxite, alumina			
	1960		1970
Cultivated land (thousand hectares)	290		240
Cultivated hectares per agricultural worker	1.2		1.3

* The Gini coefficient is an indicator of income distribution. Its value fluctuates between one and zero; as the income distribution becomes more nearly equal, the value approaches zero.

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annual decline in the rural population during the period. The flow from rural areas pushed urban population growth to 7.3 percent yearly and nearly doubled Jamaica's urbanization rate to 41 percent—the highest in the region. Average annual population growth overall probably has picked up to 1.6 percent since 1970 because of curbs in legal migration to traditional outlets and a small decline in mortality.

The financial burden of supporting an increasingly younger population caused Kingston to accelerate family planning efforts in the late 1960s. The National Family Planning Program was established in 1966, and clinics began distributing contraceptives by 1968. Increased use of contraceptives helped cut the birth rate from 38 per 1,000 persons during the 1960s to 35 per 1,000 persons since 1970. The decline in the birth rate should keep the share of Jamaica's population under 15 years of age in 1980 constant at the 1970 level of 47 percent. The population bulge in the migration-prone years should continue through 1985.

Employment and Labor Force

The creation of new jobs lagged seriously between 1960 and 1975, pushing unemployment from 14 percent to 21 percent during this period. Although the massive outflow of working-age people helped hold average annual growth of the labor force to 0.7 percent, urban job creation fell far short of absorbing the rural exodus.

Of greater importance from the point of view of migration, most of the new employment opportunities were low-paying public works jobs. Despite increased public investment, the large construction sector has failed to recover since completion of major bauxite and tourist projects in the early 1970s. Capital-intensive production methods and the recent economic setback caused the number of high-paying mining and manufacturing jobs to fall 17 percent since 1960. Bleak job prospects have caused the emigration of as many as two-thirds of all skilled workers trained in Jamaica since 1970.

Outlook

Emigration from Jamaica will remain high over the next decade. Growing numbers of working-age people and an expected rise in labor participation will increase the size of the labor force. At the same time, sluggish foreign investment inflows and prolonged fiscal austerity will limit job opportunities and wage gains. Nonetheless, strict foreign exchange controls in Jamaica (which make it difficult to prove self-sufficiency to obtain a nonresident visa to enter the United States) will work against any substantial increase in the outflow of migrants. In any case, mounting emigration pressures will give rise to additional black markets in foreign exchange and encourage greater use of fraudulent methods to gain entry. Against this background, illegal migration through the US Virgin Islands may well pick up in the years ahead.

APPENDIX C

Trinidad and Tobago

Despite its dynamic oil-based economy, Trinidad and Tobago ranks third as a source of illegal Caribbean migration to the United States. Before the mid-1960s, when legal emigration to the United Kingdom was easier, few Trinidadians emigrated. In fact, Trinidad was a small net recipient of migration. Few chose to leave the country in the 1950s because rapid economic growth provided attractive local employment opportunities. In the 1960s when much lower increases in oil output sharply cut economic growth, slower job creation and rapid expansion in the labor force resulted in heavy emigration. So far during the 1970s, employment opportunities created by renewed growth in oil output and an expansion of public services have not kept pace with the increasing number of job seekers; urban unemployment now approaches 20 percent. As a result, emigration has continued to climb, and the illegal flow to the United States is now triple the legal flow. Over the next decade, illegal migration will probably remain steady or drop slightly, resulting in a relative decline in Trinidad and Tobago's importance as a source of illegal migration.

The Economy at a Glance

Trinidad and Tobago enjoys an extremely high literacy rate, and per capita income is the highest of all the Caribbean source countries. The economy is booming, with roughly a 10-percent real increase registered last year and a similar rate expected during the rest of the decade. About 50 percent of GDP is derived from oil production and processing, which uses only 4 percent of the nation's labor force. Labor productivity in this sector is almost 12 times the national average.

Port-of-Spain is using its oil revenues to build infrastructure and energy-intensive heavy industries to diversify the economy further. The agricultural sector is decaying, however. Average sugar production during the past five years was 20 percent below the annual average during the 1960s; other agricultural production has slipped even more. Agriculture's share of GDP is now below 5 percent, though the sector still employs 15 percent of the labor force. With the decline in sugar production, tourism has become the largest source of foreign exchange following oil.

Population Patterns

High birth rates and a sharp falloff in mortality caused unprecedented population growth of 3.6 percent annually during the 1950s. Heavy emigration in the 1960s, mainly to the United States and Canada, more than halved

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Trinidad and Tobago

	1950	1960	1970
Population (thousand persons)	580	828	938
	1951-60		1961-70
Average annual population growth (percent)	3.6		1.3
	1960		1975
Labor force (thousand persons)	281 (100%)		354 (100%)
Agriculture	61 (22%)		52 (15%)
Manufacturing	45 (16%)		52 (15%)
Petroleum	11 (4%)		15 (4%)
Services	164 (58%)		235 (66%)
Daily wages (US \$)	1977		
Urban minimum	7.00		
Rural average	2.50		
	1976		
Annual per capita income (US \$)	2,360		
	1973-77		
Average annual real GDP growth (percent)	4.5		
	1960		1975
Gross domestic product (million US \$)	433 (100%)		2,449 (100%)
Agriculture	52 (12%)		107 (4%)
Manufacturing	54 (12%)		336 (14%)
Petroleum	132 (30%)		1,217 (50%)
Services	195 (45%)		789 (32%)
	1960		1975
Value added per worker (US \$)	1,541		6,918
Agriculture	852		2,058
Manufacturing	1,200		6,462
Petroleum	12,000		81,133
Services	1,189		3,357
	1975		
Real GDP (Index: 1960 = 100)	166		
Agriculture	62		
Manufacturing	182		
Petroleum	270		
Services	118		
Labor productivity (Index: 1960 = 100)	131		
Agriculture	72		
Manufacturing	157		
Petroleum	198		
Services	82		
Major Products			
Crops: sugarcane, cocoa, coffee, citrus fruits			
Manufacturing: petrochemicals			
Mining: petroleum, sulfur, gypsum			
	1960		1970
Cultivated land (thousand hectares)	330		310
Cultivated hectares per agricultural worker	5.4		6.0

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the natural increase, cutting overall population growth to 1.3 percent annually. Since 1970, a slightly lower rate of natural increase and a small rise in emigration have reduced population growth to 1.2 percent. Though official statistics do not allow a meaningful rural-urban population breakout, it is generally accepted that there has been an urban population increase since the 1950s—the result of widening rural-urban income disparities due to capital-intensive industrial development.

Port-of-Spain introduced a comprehensive birth control policy in 1968, and current surveys indicate widespread contraceptive use. Birth rates have fallen from 3.3 percent during the early 1960s to 2.6 percent during 1970-75. This decline should reduce the percentage of the population under age 15 from 43 percent in 1970 to 34 percent in 1980. Despite this improvement, the numbers already born will cause those in the migration-prone years to continue to increase over the next decade.

Employment and Labor Force

Between 1960 and 1975, employment expanded by only 30,000 jobs, about 0.8 percent yearly. About one-half of these jobs were in the public sector, which more than doubled to over 30,000. Expansion of the labor force during the same period was held to 1.6 percent annually because more than one-half of the potential entrants to the labor force left the country.

Spinoffs from Port-of-Spain's huge investment program will eventually increase job opportunities, although not enough to reduce unemployment significantly before 1985. After a long decline, Trinidad's agricultural labor force is expected to stabilize at about 50,000—the result of strong government support through infrastructure development and direct subsidies.

Outlook

Illegal emigration from Trinidad and Tobago will remain steady or drop only slightly over the next 10 years, causing its share of total illegal migration to the United States to decline. The expected one-fourth expansion in the migration-prone age group and increased labor force participation will to some extent offset the growth of job opportunities. Because of the country's shortage of skilled workers, illegal migrants coming from Trinidad and Tobago in the years ahead may well have fewer skills than other illegals from the English-speaking Caribbean.

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APPENDIX D

Haiti

Although Haiti is the poorest and most populated country in the region, it supplies only 10 percent of Caribbean illegal migration to the United States. Economic stagnation and political repression in the 1960s spurred the first wave of large-scale emigration. Political and economic improvements since the death of "Papa Doc" Duvalier in 1971 are sparking a second and larger wave by somewhat reducing the financial and security constraints that kept many Haitians at home in the past. Most migrants are urbanites going to the United States, Canada, and France, although some agricultural workers cross the border into the Dominican Republic or take small boats to the Bahamas. Haitian illegals coming to the United States now are twice the legal inflow. Given the prospect for some freedom and prosperity, we expect this illegal flow to expand during the next decade as increased rural migration to Port-au-Prince and other urban areas displaces larger numbers of urban workers. High transportation costs and stiff government fees for passports and other exit documents will continue to permit only fairly well-off urban workers to emigrate.

Economy at a Glance

Agriculture in Haiti provides 45 percent of GDP and employs nearly 80 percent of the labor force. Subsistence farming on small, highly eroded farms predominates. Coffee is the major commercial crop and provides one-third of total export income. The fledgling industrial sector produces foodstuffs, clothing, and cement for domestic use. Since the early 1970s, export-oriented assembly industries have become increasingly important.

Poor agricultural performance and scant foreign capital inflows limited economic growth to 0.8 percent annually between 1960 and 1970. Severe soil erosion and a shift to low-value food crops to avert starvation in the overcrowded rural sector added to the malaise. At the same time, foreign aversion to the repressive Papa Doc regime kept manufacturing and mining growth at a snail's pace. Slowly improving political conditions under "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who succeeded his father in 1971, have encouraged development of assembly industries and increased foreign aid for infrastructure projects. As a result, annual economic growth has averaged 3.2 percent in recent years.

Population Patterns

Very high mortality rates and rising emigration have held Haiti's population growth to 1.6 percent annually since 1950. Limited nonagricultural employment opportunities have kept urbanization well below that of other

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Haiti

	1950	1960	1970
Population (thousand persons)	3,100 (100%)	3,500	4,235 (100%)
Rural	2,666 (86%)	NA	3,346 (79%)
Urban	434 (14%)	NA	889 (21%)
	1951-70		
Average annual population growth (percent)	1.6		
Rural	1.1		
Urban	3.7		
	1960	1975	
Labor force (thousand persons)	2,027 (100%)	2,299 (100%)	
Agriculture	1,682 (83%)	1,816 (79%)	
Manufacturing and mining	101 (5%)	161 (7%)	
Services	244 (12%)	322 (14%)	
	1978		
Daily wages (US \$)			
Urban Minimum	1.60		
Rural average	0.42		
	1976		
Annual per capital income (US \$)	195		
Gini coefficient*	0.59		
	1973-77		
Average annual real GDP growth (percent)	3.2		
	1960	1975	
Gross domestic product (million US \$)	305 (100%)	922 (100%)	
Agriculture	151 (49%)	415 (45%)	
Manufacturing and mining	34 (11%)	157 (17%)	
Services	120 (40%)	350 (38%)	
	1960	1975	
Value added per worker (US \$)	150	401	
Agriculture	90	229	
Manufacturing and mining	337	975	
Services	492	1,087	
	1975		
Real GDP (Index: 1960 = 100)	125		
Agriculture	119		
Manufacturing and mining	124		
Services	132		
Labor productivity (Index: 1960 = 100)	110		
Agriculture	110		
Manufacturing and mining	78		
Services	100		
Major products			
Crops: coffee, sugarcane, sisal, corn, beans			
Manufacturing: textiles, leather, clothing, foodstuffs, light assembly industries			
Mining: Bauxite			
	1960	1970	
Cultivated land (thousand hectares)	859	840	
Cultivated hectares per agricultural worker	0.5	0.5	

* The Gini coefficient is an indicator of income distribution. Its value fluctuates between one and zero; as the income distribution becomes more nearly equal, the value approaches zero.

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major sending areas. Despite high birth rates, exceptionally high infant mortality has kept the share of population under 15 years of age below 45 percent since 1950.

Haiti's population growth has risen to 2 percent during the 1970s because ongoing improvements in sanitation and medical facilities have reduced mortality rates. Birth rates would not fall proportionately, however. Government family planning efforts are very limited, and so far there is little popular acceptance or knowledge of birth control methods.

Employment and Labor Force

Moderate population growth and emigration of working-age people held growth in the labor force to 0.8 percent annually between 1960 and 1975. The vast majority of new workers were employed in the low-paying agriculture and service sectors. Despite considerable employment growth in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector, industry absorbs just 7 percent of the work force—only marginally more than in 1950.

Extensive female and child employment keeps the labor force participation rate high. Family participation is necessary to compensate for primitive farming methods on subsistence plots and to permit male family members to work as day laborers on coffee plantations. As in the Mexican border area, women are most in demand for the Haitian assembly industry. As a result, working-age women have led the rural migration to Port-au-Prince and other urban areas.

Outlook

Illegal migration from Haiti to the United States is likely to expand rapidly in the next decade. Increased government spending on health care will spur rapid growth of population in the migration-prone age group. Stagnant agricultural performance and increasing resistance to the migration of Haitian agricultural workers by the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas should increase rural migration to urban Haitian areas. Further industrial growth should augment urban incomes and, ironically, make it easier for urbanites to leave Haiti for the United States.

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APPENDIX E

Guyana

Although severe economic difficulties caused the flow of illegals from Guyana to surge during 1977, the country is the source of only about 5 percent of total Caribbean illegal emigration to the United States. A spurt in population growth without adequate job creation turned Guyana from a small net recipient of migration during the 1950s into a gradually increasing net supplier of migrants since 1960. Virtually all Guyanese emigrants are urban workers, bound mainly for the United States and Canada. Roughly two out of three Guyanese migrating to this country do so illegally. Given the poor prospects for substantial job improvement in the foreseeable future, the backlog in the population entering the migration-prone years should keep the flow of illegals around the peak 1977 level.

Economy at a Glance

Sugar, bauxite, and rice account for at least 40 percent of Guyana's national production. Poor performance by these products has held overall economic growth to 2.6 percent since 1972. The government controls as much as 90 percent of the economy. Nationalization of the remaining private holdings in the bauxite and alumina industry in 1975 and weak world demand have kept output sluggish in this sector. Moreover, the sharp drop in world sugar prices since 1975 has cut deeply into government revenues, thereby slowing public investment projects. Labor unrest and poor weather have added to the economic downturn.

Population Patterns

Despite Guyana's emergence as a net source of emigration, sharply declining death rates pushed population growth to 2.5 percent annually during the 1960s, compared with 2.1 percent during the previous decade. Stagnating agricultural employment and poor living standards caused a massive outflow from rural areas. Urban population growth in Guyana was the highest in the region during the 1960s, with the share of the population living in urban areas going from 16 percent to 32 percent. Increasing emigration since 1970 has helped reduce birth rates and cut average annual population growth to 1.6 percent.

Racial tension and Georgetown's development strategy encourage natalist attitudes in Guyana. The division of the country's two dominant ethnic groups—East Indians and blacks—into sharply distinct political parties taints any suggestion of population control with fears of "genocide." Moreover, the country's plan to develop its rich interior would require large increases in

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Guyana

	1950	1960	1970
Population (thousand persons)	445	546 (100%)	699 (100%)
Rural	NA	459 (84%)	478 (68%)
Urban	NA	87 (16%)	221 (32%)
	1951-60		1961-70
Average annual population growth (percent)	2.1		2.5
Rural	NA		0.4
Urban	NA		9.8
	1960		1975
Labor force (thousand persons)	173 (100%)		242 (100%)
Agriculture	64 (37%)		70 (29%)
Manufacturing and mining	50 (29%)		75 (31%)
Services	59 (34%)		97 (40%)
Daily wages (US \$)	1977		
Urban minimum	2.75		
Rural average	2.20		
	1976		
Annual per capita income (US \$)	525		
	1973-77		
Average annual real GDP growth (percent)	2.6		
	1960		1975
Gross domestic product (million US \$)	103 (100%)		464 (100%)
Agriculture	27 (26%)		146 (31%)
Manufacturing and mining	22 (21%)		124 (27%)
Services	54 (53%)		194 (42%)
	1960		1975
Value added per worker (US \$)	595		1,918
Agriculture	422		2,086
Manufacturing and mining	440		1,653
Services	915		2,000
	1975		
Real GDP (Index: 1960 = 100)	157		
Agriculture	160		
Manufacturing and mining	142		
Services	165		
Labor productivity (Index: 1960 = 100)	112		
Agriculture	146		
Manufacturing and mining	94		
Services	101		
Major products			
Crops: sugarcane, rice			
Manufacturing: sugar, alumina, wood products			
Mining: bauxite			
	1960		1970
Cultivated land (thousand hectares)	360		458
Cultivated hectares per agricultural worker	5.6		6.5

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labor supply. (About 90 percent of the population lives along Guyana's coastal plain.) As a result, there is no public and little private support for family planning.

Employment and Labor

Rapid growth in the labor supply in the face of poor economic performance has pushed unemployment in Guyana to one-fourth of the work force. Increasing mechanization limited the growth of agricultural employment to only 0.6 percent annually between 1960 and 1975, despite a 3.2-percent increase in real annual output. With the migration of underemployed rural workers to the city, the productivity of urban workers has fallen slightly.

Outlook

Illegal migration from Guyana during the next decade probably will be sustained at least at the current high level. The spurt in population growth during the 1960s will continue to boost growth in the labor supply. Moreover, gradual recovery from the 1977-78 economic trough cannot be expected to absorb fully entrants into the labor force.

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APPENDIX F

Barbados

Its small population makes Barbados only the sixth largest source of Caribbean illegal migration to the United States despite the fact that its population density is the region's highest. Barbadians, like Jamaicans, traditionally took advantage of their country's colonial status to emigrate legally to the United Kingdom. Tight British immigration controls since 1962 have diverted most migrants to the United States—two-thirds enter illegally—and a smaller number to Canada. Widespread use of contraceptives has cut the birth rate to the lowest level in the Caribbean. The resulting low natural increase in population will restrain and may well decrease illegal migration over the next decade.

Economy at a Glance

Tourism dominates economic activity in Barbados, generating almost 45 percent of national output. World economic difficulties largely caused the sector to stagnate during 1973-77. Agriculture, mainly sugar cultivation, accounts for 12 percent of the GDP. Sugar production fell 11 percent in 1975 due to poor weather and has recovered only slowly. Moreover, the sharp drop in world sugar prices since 1975 has further cut sugar earnings, limiting construction and investment throughout the economy. Local industry, centered on food processing and export-oriented manufactures, also has been hurt by agricultural problems and world recession. As a result, economic growth averaged only 1.9 percent annually between 1973 and 1977.

Population Patterns

A sharp drop in birth rates and increased emigration cut Barbadian population growth to 0.2 percent annually during the 1960s, compared with 1.5 percent in the previous decade. The island's longstanding preoccupation with its high population density encouraged the establishment of one of the first publicly supported birth control programs in the world. The Barbados Family Planning Association began operations in 1955 and is largely responsible for the 22-percent decline in birth rates during the 1960s. Further declines since 1970 have reduced natural population growth to 1.2 percent, and emigration has cut actual population growth to nearly zero.

Employment and Labor Force

Emigration of many potential entrants to the job market held total labor force growth to 0.4 percent during 1960-75. Very poor agricultural performance caused a large outflow from the agricultural work force. Employment in

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Barbados

	1950	1960	1970
Population (thousand persons)	200	232	237
	1951-60		1961-70
Average annual population growth (percent)	1.5		0.2
	1960		1975
Labor force (thousand persons)	92 (100%)		98 (100%)
Agriculture	24 (26%)		17 (17%)
Manufacturing and mining	14 (15%)		16 (16%)
Services	54 (59%)		65 (66%)
Daily wages (US \$)	1977		
Urban minimum	4.00		
Rural average	3.50		
	1976		
Annual per capita income (US \$)	1,370		
	1973-77		
Average annual real GDP growth (percent)	1.9		
	1960		1975
Gross domestic product (million US \$).....	60 (100%)		385 (100%)
Agriculture	17 (28%)		46 (12%)
Manufacturing and mining	5 (8%)		58 (15%)
Services	38 (64%)		281 (73%)
	1960		1975
Value added per worker (US \$)	652		3,929
Agriculture	708		2,706
Manufacturing and mining	333		3,625
Services	704		4,323
	1975		
Real GDP (Index: 1960 = 100)	191		
Agriculture	80		
Manufacturing and mining	174		
Services	253		
Labor productivity (Index: 1960 = 100)	180		
Agriculture	114		
Manufacturing and mining	152		
Services	210		
Major products			
Crops: sugarcane, shrimp			
Manufacturing: refined sugar, processed foods			
Mining: limestone			
	1960		1970
Cultivated land (thousand hectares)	55		50
Cultivated hectares per agricultural worker	2.3		2.9

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tourism and light industry grew sufficiently to keep unemployment stable at around 10 percent, however.

Outlook

Some easing of demographic pressures in Barbados may allow a decline in illegal migration over the next decade. In 1970, the share of the population under 15 years of age was the smallest in the region. Moreover, falling birth rates should cause that age group's share of the population to continue to decline. With the bulge in the labor force already past, moderately good performance in industry and tourism should absorb a greater share of those entering the migration-prone age group.

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